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The Standard of Review for Claim 
Construction in Inter Partes Review 
by ALANA CANFIELD MANNIGÉ* 
 Abstract: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) 
hears appeals from the United States Patent & Trademark Office 
(PTO).  Recently, the American Invents Act expanded the PTO’s power in the 
patent world by creating new types of proceedings, including Inter Partes 
Review (IPR), by which one may challenge the validity of a patent.  To 
determine the validity of patent claims in IPR proceedings, the PTO must first 
perform claim construction.  As an administrative agency, the decisions of the 
PTO (such as claim construction) should be accorded significant deference by 
way of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  
 In the first ever appeal from an IPR proceeding, In re Cuozzo Speed 
Technologies, the Federal Circuit reviewed the PTO's claim construction 
according to the standard of review applicable to district courts 
(the Teva standard).  This Note argues that the PTO's claim construction should 
have been reviewed according to the standard of review applicable to agencies 
(under the APA), not the standard of review applicable to district courts 
(the Teva standard). 
 The Note then provides a detailed analysis of what the standard of review 
for PTO claim construction should be under the APA.  This Note concludes that 
for questions of fact (e.g., disputes over the meaning of extrinsic evidence), the 
appropriate standard of review is the substantial evidence standard; for questions 
of law (e.g., interpreting the PTO's Broadest Reasonable Interpretation 
standard), the appropriate standard of review should usually be the Auer “clearly 
erroneous” standard; finally, for mixed questions applying the law to the facts 
(e.g., the ultimate claim construction), the appropriate standard of review is the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.  Importantly, the standard of review for the 
ultimate claim construction is the arbitrary and capricious standard, which is 
much more deferential than the de novo standard currently being applied by the 
Federal Circuit. 
 
*     J.D. 2016 candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, earned 
a B.S. in Chemistry from Clark University, and a M.S. in Chemistry from the University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor.  Prior to law school, Alana worked in the private sector as a Senior Associate 
Scientist for Ensemble Therapeutics Corporation and in the public sector as a Patent Examiner for 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  Alana is interested in all types of Intellectual 
Property Law, particularly those that foster innovation in the pharmaceutical world.   Alana would 
like to thank Professor Jeffrey Lefstin for helpful discussions. 
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I.  Introduction 
In almost every lawsuit that goes to trial, the losing party must decide 
whether to appeal the court’s ruling.  The decision of whether or not to appeal 
is influenced by many factors, one of which is how much sway the lower 
court’s ruling would have on the appellate court — the “standard of review.”  
Standards of review may be more or less deferential to the lower court’s 
ruling.  The more deferential the standard of review, the less likely it is that 
the losing party will be able to prevail on appeal. 
Unfortunately, the appropriate standard of review on any given issue is 
frequently “ignored, manipulated, or misunderstood.”1  This is especially the 
case when it comes to appeals made from decisions of administrative 
agencies rather than the courts.2  Administrative agencies are governed by 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which outlines specific standards 
of review for agency decisions.3  In general, agencies receive more deference 
 
 1.  Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 233, 235 (2009). 
 2.  See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135 (2010). 
 3.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966). 
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for their decisions than lower courts do, primarily because agencies are 
considered to be experts in their fields.4 
Patent law is currently undergoing a transition in which many decisions 
that were previously made only by the courts are now also being made by an 
administrative agency — the United States Patent & Trademark Office 
(PTO).  The America Invents Act (AIA) of 2011 created a variety of new 
forums in which the PTO, instead of an Article III court, is the decision-
maker.5  One popular forum has been Inter Partes Review (IPR), which is an 
administrative adjudicatory proceeding whereby one can challenge the 
validity of a patent.6  Congress created IPR partly as a way to address the 
“patent troll” problem7 — the situation in which a “nonpracticing entity” 
threatens frivolous litigation in order to force companies to pay the patent 
troll licensing fees, which are frequently less costly than the costs of 
litigation.  Using IPR, the public can now initiate proceedings to have 
meritless patents declared invalid, and these proceedings are usually less 
costly and faster than litigation.8 
The Federal Circuit, who hears appeals from patent law decisions 
originating in district courts, also hears appeals from IPR proceedings.9  
As mentioned earlier, administrative decisions (such as those decisions 
made by the PTO during IPR) usually receive a higher level of deference 
than the decisions of Article III courts because administrative agencies 
are presumed to have expertise in their fields.10  So, the Federal Circuit is 
now in the interesting position of having to apply different standards of 
review to essentially the same subject matter — one standard for patent 
decisions originating from district court and another standard for patent 
decisions originating from the PTO. 
Claim construction is one such decision.  The process of defining the 
meaning of words in a claim is called “claim construction.” 11   Claim 
 
 4.  See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: 
An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1727, 1782 (2010) (“agency expertise has since the New Deal been the most commonly expressed 
rationale for judicial deference”). 
 5.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 311 (Inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (Post-grant review). 
 6.  See 35 U.S.C. § 311. 
 7.  See Adam Smith, Patent Trolls – An Overview of Proposed Legislation and a Solution that 
Benefits Small Businesses and Entrepreneurs, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 201, 224 (2014-2015). 
 8.  See EDWARD D. MANZO, THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT: A GUIDE TO PATENT LITIGATION 
AND PATENT PROCEDURE § 18:1 (2014). 
 9.  35 U.S.C. § 143. 
 10.  See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1782. 
 11.  See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 512 (3d ed. 2014). 
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construction forms the foundation for most patent lawsuits and is frequently 
dispositive for the lawsuit in general.12  This is because the patent’s claims 
define what the inventor regards as his or her invention, and therefore the 
claims define the inventor’s rights to exclude.  Throughout patent 
prosecution, claims are interpreted by the patent examiner, who gives each 
term its “broadest reasonable interpretation” (BRI) in light of the patent 
application’s specification. 13   If a patent is granted and subsequently 
litigated, the district court must “construe” the claims.  However, unlike the 
patent examiner, the district court gives the claims their “ordinary and 
customary meaning” (OCM) as interpreted by a person having ordinary skill 
in the art (PHOSITA) at the time of invention.14  Interestingly, during IPR, 
the claims are construed using the BRI standard, rather than the OCM 
standard.15 
Only recently has the Supreme Court articulated the standard of review 
for claim construction appeals originating in the district courts.16  Under 
Teva v. Sandoz, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) determine the 
standard of review for district court claim construction — questions of fact 
are to be reviewed for “clear error,” while questions of law are to be reviewed 
de novo.17  The Supreme Court in Teva elaborated on this standard, stating 
that in claim construction, factual disputes over extrinsic evidence (e.g., 
expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises) are questions of fact, while the 
ultimate claim construction is a question of law.18   The Federal Circuit 
quickly applied the Teva standard to claim construction appeals originating 
from IPR.19 
This Note argues that the Teva standard is not the appropriate standard 
of review for claim construction appeals originating from IPR.  This is 
because such appeals are guided by the principles of administrate law and 
the APA, not the FRCP.  Similar to the FRCP, the standard of review in 
administrative law depends on the law-fact distinction.20  One important 
difference between the FRCP and administrative law is that “mixed” 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
 14.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 15.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”). 
 16.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). 
 17.  Id. at 835. 
 18.  Id. at 841. 
 19.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 20.  ALFRED AMAN JR. & WILLIAM MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (3d ed. 2014). 
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questions applying the law to particular facts have a separate standard of 
review in administrative law, but under the FRCP the standard of review for 
such mixed questions has varied.21 
Accordingly, this Note proposes that the appropriate standard of review 
for IPR claim construction decisions should be based in administrative law, 
which offers a more deferential standard than the Teva standard.  This Note 
proposes which parts of claim construction are questions of fact, which parts 
are questions of law, and which parts are mixed questions applying the law 
to the facts.  For questions of fact, this Note argues that the appropriate 
standard of review is the substantial evidence standard.  For questions of law, 
this Note argues that the appropriate standard of review will usually be the 
Auer “clearly erroneous” standard.  Finally, for mixed questions applying the 
law to the facts, this Note argues that the appropriate standard of review is 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. 
One key difference between the Teva standard and the standards 
proposed above is the way the ultimate question of claim construction is 
treated.  Under Teva, the ultimate claim construction is a question of law and 
reviewed de novo.22  In contrast, this Note proposes that the ultimate question 
of claim construction in administrative law is a mixed question that requires 
application of the law to the facts and is reviewed under the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, which is more deferential than the de novo standard 
used by the Federal Circuit.23  This Note concludes by arguing that the 
combination of the BRI standard and the high deference that should be 
accorded to IPR claim construction creates an unfair environment favoring 
patent infringement defendants. 
II. Background on Claim Construction and Inter Partes Review 
A. Claim Construction 
The claims of a patent define the metes and bounds of the patentee’s 
right to exclude.  As such, the meaning of the words in each claim is of great 
importance and frequently a point of contention.  The process of deciding 
the meaning of the words in a claim is called “claim construction.”24  In 
district court, claim construction usually occurs during a Markman hearing, 
which is a hearing in which each party presents its interpretation of the 
 
 21.  FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2589 (3d ed. 2014). 
 22.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 23.  KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 394 (2d ed. 2014). 
 24.  See Nard, supra note 11, at 391. 
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claims, resulting in a decision by the judge on the actual claim construction.25  
Frequently, the Markman hearing is dispositive in a case and the winning 
party moves for summary judgment soon after the hearing.26 
In district court, claims are construed according to the OCM.27  The 
OCM of a particular term in a claim is the “[m]eaning that the term would 
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the 
invention.”28   In deciding the OCM of a claim, courts are permitted to 
consider both intrinsic evidence (the patent’s specification and prosecution 
history) and extrinsic evidence (expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, 
and learned treatises).29  The relative value of extrinsic evidence and intrinsic 
evidence is somewhat unclear.30  While recognizing that interpretation of 
claim language should not occur “in a vacuum,” the Federal Circuit has also 
stated that extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in 
determining the legally operative meaning of claim language.” 31  
Unfortunately, the courts have not clearly defined the goal of claim 
construction, which could be two-fold: (a) identifying the objective intent of 
the inventor, as it would appear to a PHOSITA and/or (b) putting the public 
on notice regarding the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. 
In contrast to district courts, the PTO does not use the OCM standard 
for claim construction.  Instead, the PTO uses the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” (BRI) standard.32  The rationale for this difference has been 
that the PTO construes claims during examination, during which time the 
applicant is free to amend the claims.33  Therefore, the PTO construes the 
claims broadly in order to force applicants to amend claims whose scope is 
not supported by the patent’s specification.34  Like the OCM standard, the 
BRI standard is defined in light of the patent’s specification and from the 
perspective of PHOSITA.  While the OCM and BRI could be equivalent, the 
OCM should never be broader than the BRI (for example, the BRI of the 
 
 25.  Id. at 398. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 28.  Id. at 1313. 
 29.  Id. at 1317 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
 30.  The debate between the value of intrinsic evidence and extrinsic evidence has been 
compared to the debate between the Corbin and Williston approaches to the interpretation of 
contracts.  See Nard, supra note 11, at 76. 
 31.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citations omitted). 
 32.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
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word “green” might include all shades of green, while the OCM of the word 
“green” might be a particular shade of green). 
B. Inter Partes Review 
Historically, the only way for one to challenge the validity of a patent 
has been to first be sued for patent infringement and then counterclaim that 
the patentee’s patent is invalid.  This was highly inefficient, especially given 
the prevalence of frivolous lawsuits by nonpracticing entities.  In 2011, 
Congress passed the AIA, which created a new forum allowing any member 
of the public to challenge the validity of a patent in a post-grant proceeding 
before the PTO, regardless of whether the challenger has first been sued for 
patent infringement.  Under the AIA, one can challenge the validity of a 
patent in a few different ways, but this Note focuses on IPR, which has 
become quite popular due to the high success rate of those who initiate IPR.35  
IPR is considered an adjudicatory proceeding, containing procedures such as 
discovery and a hearing before a panel of three administrative law judges, 
who form part of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).36 
During inter partes review, the challenger can claim that the patent is 
invalid for lack of novelty and lack of nonobviousness.37  Importantly, most 
invalidity decisions require that the PTO first engage in claim construction.  
Unlike district courts, PTAB uses the BRI standard of claim construction.38  
The PTO’s decision to use the BRI standard in IPR has been criticized by 
many, who argue that the appropriate standard should have been the OCM 
standard.39 
III. What Standard of Review Should the Federal Circuit Apply 
 
 35.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 311 (inter partes review); 35 U.S.C. § 321 (post-grant review). 
 36.  See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for 
the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013). 
 37.  4 Pat. L. Fundamentals § 15A: 36 (2d ed. 2015). 
 38.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”). 
 39.  See Grant Ford, Broadest Reasonable Interpretation vs. Ordinary and Customary 
Meaning: Challenges Introduced by Applying Different Claim Construction Standards at the PTAB 
and District Court, http://www.sughrue.com/Broadest-Reasonable-Interpretation-vs-Ordinary-
and-Customary-Meaning-8211-Challenges-Introduced-by-Applying-Different-Claim-
Construction-Standards-at-the-PTAB-and-District-Courts-09-11-2014.com (last visited Apr. 1, 
2015). 
2 MANNIGE ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_NW_NN_MK (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:07 PM 
164 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
 
to Claim Construction in Inter Partes Review? 
As mentioned earlier, the AIA has recently created a shift in power in 
the patent system.40  Decisions that used to be the sole province of the courts 
are now also the province of the PTO, an administrative agency.  As such, 
one can expect administrative law to start playing a much bigger role in the 
patent system, especially when it comes to the standard of review for IPR 
decisions.  Unfortunately, there is a lag in the courts recognizing the 
importance of administrative law, probably due to simple inertia.  One prime 
example of this lag is the case In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, which was 
the first appeal of an IPR decision to the Federal Circuit.  One issue on appeal 
was claim construction.41 
As luck would have it, while In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies was 
pending, the Supreme Court decided the Teva case, which defined the 
standard of judicial review for the claim construction decisions of a district 
court. 42   Under Teva, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while 
conclusions regarding disputed facts are reviewed for clear error, in 
accordance with Rule 52 of the FRCP.43  Two weeks later, the Federal 
Circuit applied the brand new Teva standard of review to the claim 
construction in the first ever IPR appeal, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies.44  
Since the record in that case had no extrinsic evidence, there were no factual 
disputes and the Federal Circuit’s standard of review was simply de novo.45 
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s application of Teva to claim 
construction in IPR is inappropriate because IPR claim construction occurs 
during an administrative adjudicatory proceeding, and therefore the standard 
of review is governed by the principles of administrative law and the APA, 
not the FRCP.  In both the context of the FRCP and the APA, a key issue in 
determining the appropriate standard of review is whether the court is 
reviewing a question of law or a question of fact.46  In Teva, the court 
considered only these two categories because they are all that is mentioned 
in the FRCP.  Unlike the FRCP, administrative law recognizes a third 
category — “mixed” questions that involve agency discretion for applying 
 
 40.  See Wasserman, supra note 36, at 2018. 
 41.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1282. 
 42.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835. 
 43.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 835; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6). 
 44.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1282–83. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6); 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
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law to the facts.47  Therefore, the first step in identifying the appropriate level 
of deference for claim construction in IPR is distinguishing which aspects of 
the decision were drawn to (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, and (c) 
mixed questions applying the law to the facts.48 
A. Distinguishing Between Questions of Fact, Questions of Law, and 
“Mixed” Questions 
Distinguishing between questions of fact, questions of law, and 
“mixed” applications of the law to facts is the first step in determining the 
appropriate standard of review of an agency decision. 49   According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, one definition for a question of fact is “an issue that 
has not been predetermined and authoritatively answered by the law.”50  On 
the other hand, a question of law can be defined as “a question that the law 
itself has authoritatively answered, so that the court may not answer it as a 
matter of discretion.”51  Black’s Law Dictionary does not have a definition 
for mixed questions, but in administrative law mixed questions are questions 
that involve “the application of the law to facts.”52  Questions of law ask how 
the law itself should be interpreted in general; mixed questions ask what the 
outcome should be in a specific situation after one applies the law to the 
facts. 
Distinguishing between a pure question of law and a “mixed” 
application of the law to particular facts is often a difficult task.53  Robert 
Levin has suggested referring to “mixed” questions as “discretionary” 
questions.54  According to Levin, one way of distinguishing questions of law 
from fact is for courts to “separate normative issues falling within their own 
province (questions of law) from normative issues that are primarily for the 
 
 47.  NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (stating that “[w]here the question is 
one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering 
the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court’s function is limited” and the decision should 
be “accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a reasonable basis in law.”); see also Ronald M. 
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1985) (arguing that 
the application of law to fact is an instance of agency discretion). 
 48.  Aman and Mayton, supra note 20, at 357–58. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (4th ed. 2011). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Aman and Mayton, supra note 20, at 358. 
 53.  Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 
11–12 (1985). 
 54.  Id. 
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agency (questions of discretion).” 55   In light of the seminal Chevron 
decision,56 perhaps the appropriate way to tell whether an issue is within the 
province of the courts or the agency is to look at legislative intent — if there 
was clear legislative intent not to delegate the issue to the agency, then the 
issue is question of law; but if there was intent to delegate the issue to the 
agency or intent was ambiguous, then the issue is a “mixed” one of agency 
discretion. 
In the case of claim construction, the starting point for the task of 
identifying questions of law, questions of fact, and mixed questions is the 
Supreme Court’s recent Teva decision.  According to Teva, questions of fact 
in claim construction are those factual disputes arising from extrinsic 
evidence.57  Extrinsic evidence is “all evidence external to the patent and 
prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, 
and learned treatises.”58  In contrast, Teva identifies that the ultimate claim 
construction based solely on intrinsic evidence is a question of law. 59  
Intrinsic evidence includes the specification and prosecution history.60  The 
court’s rationale for why the ultimate claim construction is a question of law 
was that it is similar to “construing other written instruments, such as deeds, 
contracts, or tariffs,”61 which are questions of law. 
This Note agrees with the Court’s conclusion in Teva that disputes over 
extrinsic evidence constitute questions of fact.  However, this Note argues that 
the Court in Teva conflated two distinct issues when identifying questions of 
law: (a) the ultimate claim construction, and (b) disputes over the meaning of 
intrinsic evidence.  While this conflation may be proper in the context of the 
FRCP, it is improper in the context of administrative law, which requires 
distinguishing questions of law (e.g., disputes over the meaning of extrinsic 
evidence) from mixed questions (e.g., the ultimate claim construction) when 
identifying the appropriate standard of review.  This Note analyzes the ultimate 
 
 55.  Levin, supra note 53, at 13. 
 56.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(identifying Congress’ intent to delegate as important in deciding the appropriate level of deference 
for an agency’s interpretation of its own statute); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action 
with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to 
foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”). 
 57.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 58.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 
980 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
 59.  Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 837. 
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claim construction separately from disputes over the meaning of intrinsic 
evidence. 
This Note argues that the ultimate question of claim construction is 
likely a “mixed” question that requires applying the law to the facts.  Firstly, 
the ultimate claim construction depends on applying the appropriate legal 
standard (either the OCM or the BRI) to extrinsic factual evidence and the 
intrinsic evidence.62   Therefore, the ultimate claim construction requires 
applying the law to the facts, making it a “mixed” question of law and fact.  
In a similar vein, all claim construction involves adopting the perspective of 
PHOSITA, and thus requires applying the law (i.e., the PHOSITA standard) 
to the facts.  One could argue that the application of legal standards similar 
to the PHOSITA standard (such as the reasonable person standard in torts) 
have traditionally been the realm of the jury and should therefore be 
questions of fact.63  However, the fact that an issue is put to a jury does not 
necessitate that the issue is a question of fact (for example, the legal 
conclusion of obviousness in patent law is frequently put to the jury).64  In 
the case of patent law, the Supreme Court has implied that the PHOSITA 
analysis does not result in a factual finding by stating that the ultimate 
question of obviousness is a legal conclusion,65 as is the ultimate question of 
claim construction.66  However, in both cases, the legal conclusions depend 
on subsidiary factual findings,67  and therefore this Note argues that the 
ultimate question of claim construction is a “mixed” application of the law 
to the facts. 
Secondly, this Note argues that Levin’s framework supports the 
conclusion that the ultimate claim construction is a mixed question because 
Congress likely intended for the ultimate question of claim construction in 
IPR to be the province of the PTO, not the courts.68  When the AIA was 
passed, the PTO had been applying the BRI standard for years, while the 
courts had been applying the OCM standard.  The Federal Circuit has even 
condoned the PTO’s rule establishing the use of the BRI standard for claim 
construction, thereby acknowledging Congress’ delegation of authority to 
 
 62.  Id. at 841; MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
 63.  Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 
1867, 1876–78 (1966). 
 64.  Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 67.  Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1359; Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 68.  See Melissa F. Wasserman, supra note 36, at 1981 (making a compelling argument on 
why the AIA may have been intended to shift the bulk of patent law interpretation and enforcement 
from the courts to the PTO). 
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the PTO for establishing the substantive standard.69  This history supports 
the conclusion that applications of the BRI standard are the province of the 
PTO, not the courts. 
In contrast to the ultimate claim construction, this Note argues that 
disputes over the interpretation of intrinsic evidence in post-grant 
proceedings come in many varieties, and could be either a “mixed” question 
or a question of law.  More specifically, this Note contends that disputes over 
intrinsic evidence come in two major categories: (a) disputes that can only 
be resolved by adopting the perspective of PHOSITA, and (b) disputes that 
can be resolved using judicial canons of claim construction.  The former 
category represents a “mixed” question of applying the PHOSITA standard 
to the facts, while the latter category represents a pure question of law.  
Admittedly, an analysis under Levin’s framework shows that Congress’ 
intent on the topic of intrinsic evidence is unclear, since both the courts and 
the PTO had been interpreting intrinsic evidence for years when the AIA was 
enacted.  However, an analysis of the different types of disputes regarding 
intrinsic evidence does show that category (b) disputes have more typically 
been deemed pure questions of law. 
Examples of category (a) disputes include: the meaning of an 
ambiguous figure in the drawings, the role of preferred embodiments 
(illustrative vs. limitative), and the role of the specification’s distinctions 
over the prior art.70  Examples of category (b) disputes are the traditional 
legal cannons of claim construction (similar in nature to canons associated 
with contractual and statutory interpretation), including: the doctrine of 
claim differentiation, the treatment of the preamble and transition phrases, 
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, the doctrine of construing 
claims to encompass the preferred embodiments, and the doctrine of 
interpreting claim language in light of the specification. 
Note that each of the examples in category (b) relates to canons of claim 
interpretation, and those principles are similar to canons of contract 
interpretation.  This is important because in Teva, the Supreme Court’s 
rationale for why the question of the ultimate claim construction is a question 
of law was that it is similar to “construing other written instruments, such as 
deeds, contracts, or tariffs,”71 which are questions of law.  This Note argues 
that such a rationale applies more to category (b) intrinsic evidence than it 
 
 69.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1282. 
 70.  For a detailed description on these types of disputes, see Peter S. Menell et al., Patent 
Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
711, 749 (2010). 
 71.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 837. 
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does to either category (a) intrinsic evidence or the ultimate claim 
construction.  Interpreting category (a) intrinsic evidence involves applying 
the PHOSITA legal standard to the facts; the ultimate claim construction is 
also about applying a legal standard (OCM or BRI) to the facts.  In contrast, 
interpreting category (b) intrinsic evidence involves utilizing only legal 
principles of interpreting a document, which is similar to contract 
interpretation, a question of law.72 
B. The Standard of Review for Questions of Fact 
In claim construction, the questions of fact are those that arise out of 
disputes over extrinsic evidence.73  The standard of review for such findings 
of fact depends on whether post-grant proceedings are deemed formal or 
informal. 74   In a formal proceeding, questions of fact are reviewed for 
“substantial evidence.”75  In an informal proceeding, questions of fact are 
reviewed under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review. 76   A 
proceeding is formal if its enabling statute requires the proceeding to be 
determined “on the record” after the “opportunity for an agency hearing.”77  
The AIA does not explicitly identify IPR as a formal proceeding, and while 
the AIA does require an “oral hearing” and discovery, it does not require that 
decisions be made “on the record.” 78   Therefore, one could reasonably 
assume that IPR proceedings do not meet the statutory test for being 
classified as formal proceedings and should be reviewed under the arbitrary 
or capricious standard or review. 
However, while IPR proceedings do not meet the traditional test for 
being classified as formal, this Note argues that IPR will nevertheless likely 
be treated as a formal proceeding by the Federal Circuit and therefore 
questions of fact during IPR should be reviewed for “substantial evidence.”  
Melissa Wasserman has already made the argument that post-grant 
proceedings should be treated as formal proceedings because they possess 
many of the hallmarks of formal adjudication, such as discovery and oral 
 
 72.  See Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that contract 
interpretation is a question of law); but see Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(stating that contract interpretation is a mixed questions of law and fact). 
 73.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841. 
 74.  5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 75.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). 
 76.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 77.  5 U.S.C. § 554. 
 78.  35 U.S.C. § 316. 
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argument.79  Wasserman’s argument is backed by case law that has treated 
adjudicatory proceedings as formal proceedings, despite the lack of the 
phrase “on the record” in the enabling statute.80  Even more telling is that in 
In re Gartside, the Federal Circuit decided that the substantial evidence 
standard of formal proceedings applies to appeals from PTO interference 
proceedings, which are less formal than the new AIA post-grant 
proceedings.81  In In re Gartside, the Federal Circuit had based its conclusion 
partly on the fact that appeals from interferences were required to be 
reviewed “on the record” developed by the PTO.82  The AIA has a similar 
requirement for IPR, requiring review to be based “on the record” developed 
by the PTO.83  Therefore, it is likely that the standard of review for factual 
findings in IPR will be the substantial evidence standard. 
Compared to the “clearly erroneous” standard that the Teva decision 
has articulated for questions of fact arising from district court decisions, the 
substantial evidence standard is quite similar. 84   The clearly erroneous 
standard focuses on whether a judge has a “[d]efinite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.”85  The substantial evidence standard 
requires the reviewing court to ask whether the lower court’s decision was 
supported by “[s]uch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.”86  Some have noted that the two standards 
have nearly identical outcomes.87  Interestingly, one of the few cases in 
which a difference has been found is a patent law case, Dickinson v. Zurko, 
in which the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he difference is a subtle one — 
so fine that (apart from the present case) we have failed to uncover a single 
instance in which a reviewing court conceded that use of one standard rather 
 
 79.  See Wasserman, supra note 36, at 1981. 
 80.  See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(applying a presumption of formality when a statute requires a hearing); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. 
v. U.S. E.P.A., 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying the Chevron two-step test to an 
agency’s interpretation of the level of formality required); but see City of W. Chicago, Ill. v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring the phrases “on the 
record” and “hearing” both to be present for formal proceedings to be triggered). 
 81.  In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 82.  Id. at 1313. 
 83.  35 U.S.C. § 144 (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall review 
the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 84.  Amanda Peters, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
 85.  U. S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 86.  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
 87.  Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 679 at n. 36 (2002). 
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than the other would in fact have produced a different outcome.”88  In Zurko, 
the Court stated that the substantial evidence standard is “slightly less strict” 
than the clearly erroneous standard,89 but post-Zurko the precise contours of 
the two standards remains elusive. 
C. The Standard of Review for Questions of Law 
Usually, questions of law that are not interpretations of a statute that an 
agency administers are reviewed independently by the appellate court.90  If 
that were the case for claim construction, then the Federal Circuit’s decision 
to apply de novo review in In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies would be 
proper.  Such a result would also be in accord with the Marbury v. Madison 
doctrine that courts are ultimately responsible for interpreting the law.91  
Unfortunately, claim construction presents a more nuanced problem than 
simply being a pure question of law.  Firstly, claim construction involves 
subsidiary factual conclusions.92  Secondly, identifying exactly what “the law” 
is in the context of claim construction is complicated because there is 
judicially created common law regarding claim construction (the OCM 
standard)93 and there is also administrative precedent for claim construction 
(the BRI standard).94 
As mentioned earlier, distinguishing questions of law from applications 
of law to particular facts is quite important.95  Questions of law require a 
court to identify the appropriate legal standard, while applications of law 
require a court to apply that standard to a particular set of facts.96  In In re 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, the Federal Circuit did in fact address a pure 
question of law because the court identified that the BRI standard (not the 
OCM standard) was the appropriate legal standard for claim construction in 
IPR proceedings.97  The court then treated the application of that law as if it 
were simply another pure question of law, thereby ignoring the precedent in 
administrative law that distinguishes pure legal questions from “mixed” 
 
 88.  Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–163 (1999). 
 89.  Id. at 162. 
 90.  See Werhan, supra note 23, at 362 (2d ed. 2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[t]he 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law . . .”). 
 91.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 92.  Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 838. 
 93.  Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. 
 94.  See, e.g., In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 95.  See Aman and Mayton, supra note 20, at 357–58. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1282. 
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questions of law and fact.98  This Note argues that after the court identified 
the BRI as being the appropriate standard, the only pure question of law left 
was what exactly the phrase “broadest reasonable interpretation” means. 
But the determination of what exactly the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” means lies squarely with the PTO because the BRI is 
language from the PTO’s own regulation.99  An agency is entitled to special 
Auer deference for interpretations of its own regulations — more precisely, 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to “controlling 
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”100  
Thus, even if the Federal Circuit were to address the general meaning of the 
BRI, it would have to do so with a high level of deference to the PTO.  It is 
noteworthy, however, that recently there has been growing opposition to 
Auer deference and it is unclear whether this standard is here to stay.101 
While the PTO should be afforded Auer deference for its interpretation 
of the BRI, this may be moot in light of pending legislation that could make 
the PTO’s claim construction standard the OCM rather than the BRI.102  
Since such legislation would come directly from Congress, it would override 
the PTO’s regulations.  In that case, the PTO would not be entitled to special 
Auer deference for questions of law in claim construction, since it would not 
be interpreting its own regulations.  Instead, the PTO would be interpreting 
a phrase in a statute that it administers, which means that the PTO would be 
afforded either Chevron or Skidmore deference for its interpretations of the 
OCM standard. 103   It is noteworthy that under Brand X, the PTO’s 
interpretation of the OCM would not be bound by the judicial precedent on 
the subject.104  Thus, the Federal Circuit would be required to give the PTO 
either Chevron or Skidmore deference for an interpretation of the OCM that 
 
 98.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1282–83. 
 99.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”). 
 100.  Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462–63 (1997). 
 101.  Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Justice Scalia, in his 
dissent, stated that “For decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the 
authority to say what their rules mean . . .”). 
 102.  See H.R. 5360, 113th Cong. § 3308 (2014); S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 7 (2013). 
 103.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (1984); see also Wasserman, supra note 36, at 2018 (making a 
normative argument for why the PTO should receive Chevron deference, at least for adjudications). 
 104.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) 
(“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s 
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency 
construction.”). 
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is different from the Federal Circuit’s own jurisprudence regarding the 
OCM. 
Even if the pending legislation is never passed, there is still a lingering 
issue regarding the PTO’s current interpretation of the OCM.  This is because 
the PTO in fact uses the OCM standard as part of its current analysis of the 
BRI.105 According to the PTO, “Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, 
words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning 
is inconsistent with the specification. The plain meaning of a term means the 
ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill 
in the art at the time of the invention.”106  Identifying the level of deference 
the PTO should receive for its interpretation of a judicially created common 
law standard is a difficult task.  The appropriate level of deference for agency 
interpretations of common law doctrine has been characterized as a “fault 
line” in administrative law, lacking definitive answers. 107   And while 
agencies are permitted to interpret the statutes that they administer in a way 
that is contrary to the judicial precedent regarding the statute,108 this holding 
has never explicitly been extended to agency interpretations of judicially 
created common law. 
This Note argues that the first step in identifying the level of deference 
the PTO should receive when interpreting common law is determining 
whether Congress intended to import common law claim construction doctrine 
into the AIA. 109   If Congress intended to import common law claim 
construction doctrine into the AIA, then the PTO would indeed be 
interpreting a common law doctrine and the level of deference is debatable, 
ranging from de novo review to Chevron-like deference.110  If, however, 
Congress did not intend to import common law claim construction doctrine 
into the AIA, then the PTO would not be interpreting a common law 
doctrine; instead, the PTO would simply be enforcing its own BRI using its 
own parallel version of the OCM. 
 
 105.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
 106.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 107.  Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 800 (2010). 
 108.  Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982–83 (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute 
unambiguously forecloses the agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency 
to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”). 
 109.  See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 123–25 (1944) (using legislative intent to 
determine whether the common law meaning of the word “employee” had been imported into the 
relevant statute). 
 110.  Pojanowski, supra note 107, at 807–13. 
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Unfortunately, it is unclear whether Congress intended to import 
common law claim construction doctrine into the AIA.  On the one hand, the 
PTO and the Federal Circuit have taken the broad stance that Congress did 
not have this intention.111  Rather than choosing to apply the OCM standard 
of claim construction, the PTO decided that the BRI standard was 
appropriate for claim construction in IPR.  The Federal Circuit has affirmed 
the PTO’s decision, stating that Congress implicitly adopted the BRI 
standard in the AIA.112  Unless the pending legislation is passed or the 
Federal Circuit’s decision is appealed, the law of the land is that Congress 
intended a BRI standard.  Unfortunately, this conclusion doesn’t answer the 
ultimate question because it suffers from circular logic, since the BRI 
standard itself incorporates the language of the OCM standard, and no 
mention of this fact was made in In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies. 113  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit and the parties involved in In re Cuozzo 
Speed Technologies did pit the BRI against the OCM,114 creating an “either-
or” situation, suggesting that what was really being debated was the ultimate 
standard of construction, rather than the PTO’s underlying use of the OCM 
as part of its BRI standard.  Therefore, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies 
sheds little light on Congress’ intent regarding the PTO’s underlying usage 
of the OCM standard as part of its BRI standard.115 
On the other hand, there is pending legislation to replace the PTO’s BRI 
standard with the OCM standard, suggesting that at least some in Congress 
may have intended a common law OCM standard.116  Additionally, the PTO’s 
own rules cite to judicial precedent regarding the OCM standard,117 implying 
that the PTO itself believes that it is interpreting judicial common law when it 
applies the OCM standard during its BRI analysis.  Granted, the PTO could 
be using the common law OCM standard as simply an instructive tool for 
creating its own separate OCM standard, in which case the PTO’s analysis 
of the OCM is an independently created part of its BRI standard, entitled to 
Auer deference. 118   However, this Note argues that the more likely 
conclusion is that the PTO is directly interpreting the common law OCM 
 
 111.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1282. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
 114.  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 778 F.3d at 1278–79. 
 115.  Id. at 1290–92 (Newman, dissenting) (articulating an argument for the use of the OCM 
in IPR rather than the BRI). 
 116.  See H.R. 5360, 113th Cong. § 3308 (2014); S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 7 (2013). 
 117.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014). 
 118.  Id. 
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standard because the PTO directly cites case law on the subject. 119  
Therefore, this Note argues that for now, the most logical conclusion is that 
while it is unclear whether Congress intended to import the common law 
OCM standard into the AIA, the PTO has taken upon itself the duty of 
interpreting the common law OCM standard, which means that the 
appropriate level of deference is unsettled and could range from de novo 
review to Chevron deference.120 
As a final observation, there is a certain amount of irony regarding the 
PTO’s interpretation of the common law OCM.  If Congress passes a statute 
requiring the PTO to use the OCM standard, then the PTO is free under 
Brand X to interpret the OCM differently than the judiciary; on the other 
hand, if Congress doesn’t require the PTO to use the OCM but the PTO 
continues to do so, then the PTO may be less free because it has likely chosen 
to interpret the common law OCM standard, with the possibility of de novo 
review.121  In other words, the PTO may have more freedom to interpret the 
OCM standard and more deference for that interpretation if Congress 
requires the PTO to use the OCM standard than if Congress doesn’t create 
such a requirement, because the PTO has chosen to use the common law 
OCM standard of its own accord. 
D. The Standard of Review for “Mixed” Questions Applying Law to 
the Facts 
In administrative law, “mixed” questions are those that apply the law to 
the particular facts of a case.122  In the case of claim construction, this Note 
argues that the ultimate claim construction is a mixed question because it 
applies a legal standard (OCM or BRI) to particular facts (the intrinsic and 
extrinsic evidence).  This Note also argues that some disputes over intrinsic 
evidence that rely only on PHOSITA’s understanding (category (a), at pg. 
164, disputes discussed above) are also “mixed” questions that involve 
applying a legal standard (the PHOSITA standard) to the facts. 
The standard of review for mixed questions is the catch-all provision of the 
APA: the “arbitrary and capricious”123 standard.124  The arbitrary and capricious 
 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Pojanowski, supra note 107, at 807–13. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See Aman and Mayton, supra note 20, at 358. 
 123.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 124.  Werhan, supra note 23, at 394; see also FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE 296–97 (5th ed. 2014) (implying that for formal adjudication, the standard of review 
applied may be the Hearst standard) (citing NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 111 (1944)). 
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standard of review is deferential — the courts examine the reasonableness of the 
agency’s decision, not the correctness of the agency’s decision.125  Sometimes 
courts apply a stricter version of the arbitrary and capricious standard — the 
“hard look” doctrine.  The modern standard for hard look review was established 
in State Farm, in which the Court stated that: 
 
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”126 
 
Many view the adequate reasons requirement of hard look review to be 
very similar to step two of the Chevron test.127  As it relates to the substantial 
evidence standard discussed earlier for factual findings in formal 
adjudications, hard look review is considered to be more deferential, but 
appellate courts tend to treat the two standards similarly.128  Some would argue 
that there is in fact no difference between the substantial evidence standard 
and the arbitrary or capricious standard.  Justice Scalia has equated the two 
standards.129  As it compares to Auer deference discussed above for agency 
interpretations of their own regulations, the Auer standard is based on the 
“clearly erroneous” standard, which has been described as “broader” than 
the arbitrary and capricious standard “because it mandates a review of the 
entire record and all the evidence rather than just a search for substantial 
evidence to support the administrative finding or decision.”130 
IV. The Claim Construction Standard Should Be the Same for 
District Court and Inter Partes Review. 
Finally, this Note argues that if the Federal Circuit ultimately applies a 
more deferential standard for IPR claim construction, then the standard of 
deference, combined with the use of the BRI during IPR, will allow defendants 
in patent infringement lawsuits to have their cake and eat it too.  By affording 
 
 125.  Werhan, supra note 23, at 394. 
 126.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. U.S., 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962)). 
 127.  Funk, supra note 124, at 186–87. 
 128.  Id. at 163. 
 129.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 
F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[i]n their application to the requirement of factual support the 
substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test are one and the same.”). 
 130.  Norway Hill Pres. & Prot. Ass’n v. King Cnty. Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267, 274 (1976). 
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more deference to invalidity decisions based on the PTO’s BRI standard than to 
invalidity decisions based on a district court’s OCM standard, the standards of 
review favor the BRI standard.  The BRI standard itself favors defendants, who 
will argue for broader claim construction during IPR because broader claims 
cover more prior art and patents are most often held invalid due to lack of novelty 
or lack of obviousness based on the prior art. 
Moreover, the current system forces plaintiffs to directly confront the 
traditional infringement/validity quandary, while allowing defendants to 
escape it.  The infringement/validity quandary is the concept that each party 
in a patent infringement lawsuit is typically torn between arguing a narrow 
versus a broad claim construction.  This is because defendants typically 
counterclaim that the plaintiff’s patent is invalid.  Plaintiffs want a broad 
claim construction when arguing infringement because they want to show 
that the defendant’s product is within the scope of the claims; but plaintiffs 
want a narrow claim construction when arguing invalidity because they want 
to show that the prior art is not within the scope of their claims.  In contrast, 
defendants want a broad claim construction when arguing invalidity and a 
narrow claim construction when arguing infringement. 
The current system (when applying the APA for the standard of review) 
allows defendants to escape this quandary.  If defendants are successful 
during IPR in having the patent declared invalid, then the Federal Circuit 
will frequently affirm the IPR decision because of the highly deferential 
standard of review.  If defendants are unsuccessful, then they can reasonably 
assume that an invalidity claim would be unsuccessful in district court 
because the district court would apply the narrower OCM standard rather 
than the BRI standard.  Therefore, the defendants are able to argue for a 
narrow OCM for patent infringement purposes, unburdened by the normal 
tension of simultaneously having to argue invalidity and non-infringement.  
The defendants need not worry about having previously argued for a broad 
interpretation at the PTO, because by definition the BRI is the “broadest” 
interpretation.  The defendants are free to argue a narrow claim construction 
in district court under the OCM standard.  Even if the defendants lose in 
district court, they can still appeal to the Federal Circuit and receive de novo 
review for the ultimate claim construction. 
Plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits, on the other hand, lose out in 
this claim construction scheme.  First, plaintiffs must argue for a narrow claim 
construction under the inherently broader BRI standard in order to prevent 
their patents from being declared invalid.  This decision favors defendants by 
using the BRI and should receive a high level of deference.  If the patent is not 
declared invalid, then the plaintiff must switch sides and focus on proving 
infringement, which will require the plaintiff to argue for a broader claim 
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construction under the narrower OCM standard.  To make matters even more 
difficult for plaintiffs, the district court case may be stayed until the IPR 
proceeding is finished.131  Therefore, all of the plaintiffs’ arguments before the 
PTO for a narrow BRI can later be cited by defendants in district court to show 
that the plaintiffs’ broader OCM argument in district court is inconsistent with 
the plaintiffs’ earlier narrower BRI argument before the PTO. 
While it is true that one purpose of the AIA was to protect defendants 
from frivolous litigation by nonpracticing entities,132 it is important that the 
patent system avoid extremes and maintain the delicate balance that is 
required for fairness to prevail.  Not every case of patent infringement 
involves a nonpracticing entity, and many valid patents are infringed every 
year.  For some companies, like startups, a valid patent means the difference 
between survival and extinction.  The combination of the BRI and the high 
deference that should accompany IPR proceedings creates an unfair 
environment that allows defendants to avoid the validity/infringement 
quandary, while forcing plaintiffs to confront it directly.  Therefore, this Note 
argues that the claim construction standard should be equivalent in district 
court and post-grant proceedings. 
Bills have been introduced in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, proposing to change the IPR claim construction standard 
from the BRI standard to the typical district court OCM standard.133  This is 
certainly one route towards achieving the same claim construction standard 
in both district court and IPR proceedings.  Another possibility would be an 
attempt to unify the two standards.  While the phrases “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” and “ordinary and customary meaning” appear to be quite 
different, the two standards have many similarities.  Interestingly, both the 
BRI and OCM use the OCM standard as the starting point.  According to the 
PTO: 
 
Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must 
be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent 
with the specification. The plain meaning of a term means the 
ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by those of 
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.134 
 
 
 131.  See Robert A. Matthews, Jr., 4 Annotated Patent Digest § 25:127.80. 
 132.  See Smith, supra note 7, at 224. 
 133.  See H.R. 5360, 113th Cong. § 3308 (2014); S. 1720, 113th Cong. § 7 (2013). 
 134.  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111.01 (9th ed. 2014) (emphasis 
added). 
2 MANNIGE ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_NW_NN_MK (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:07 PM 
SUMMER 2016] CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 179 
 
While the PTO does make a distinction between its BRI standard and 
the OCM standard based on the OCM’s focus on intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence,135 the PTO’s use of the plain meaning standard is actually in light 
of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.  For example, the PTO states that 
examiners “[m]ust give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation in 
light of the specification” and that “[t]he words of the claim must be given 
their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the 
specification.”136  The PTO even directly cites Phillips, stating that:  “The 
ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a variety of 
sources, including ‘the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the 
specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning 
relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of 
the art.’”137  These statements show the importance of intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence when determining the BRI of a claim and point to the real 
possibility of unifying claim construction under a single standard. 
V. Conclusion 
Claim construction lies at the heart of any patent infringement suit and 
is often dispositive in a case.  For years, the Federal Circuit has had the final 
say on the meaning of claims, reviewing claim construction de novo on 
appeal.  In Teva, the Supreme Court curbed the Federal Circuit’s power by 
holding that factual disputes about extrinsic evidence must be reviewed for 
clear error under the FRCP.  However, the Court in Teva left the ultimate 
claim construction in the hands of the Federal Circuit, holding that the 
ultimate claim construction is a question of law that should be reviewed de 
novo.  The Federal Circuit promptly applied the Teva standard to appeals 
from IPR proceedings at the PTO.  This Note argues that this decision was 
misguided. 
The AIA did more than just create post-grant proceedings.  In creating 
such proceedings, the AIA chipped away at the power of the Federal Circuit 
and redistributed some of that power to an administrative agency — the PTO.  
Because claim construction during IPR is a decision made by an 
administrative agency, it deserves more deference than claim construction 
that occurs during district court proceedings.  One possible justification for 
this shift in power is that unlike many judges, administrative agencies like 
the PTO are presumed to have expertise in their field.  Another possible 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314). 
2 MANNIGE ARTICLE_FINAL_TOM_NW_NN_MK (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/2016  3:07 PM 
180 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:2 
 
justification is that the PTO is part of the Department of Commerce, which 
is part of the executive branch and under the power of the President, an 
elected official.  Whatever the justification, the Federal Circuit must 
acknowledge that PTO decisions should usually receive more deference than 
district court decisions. 
Like the standard of review for district court decisions, the standard of 
review for PTO decisions depends on the law-fact distinction.  Unlike the 
standard of review for district court proceedings, administrative law 
recognizes a third category — “mixed” questions applying the law to 
particular facts. I have attempted to categorize which aspects of claim 
construction are questions of fact, which are questions of law, and which are 
“mixed.”  Like the Court in Teva, this Note concludes that factual disputes 
concerning extrinsic evidence are questions of fact.  Unlike the Court in 
Teva, this Note concludes that the ultimate claim construction is a “mixed” 
question applying the law to the facts.  Also unlike the Court in Teva, this 
Note distinguishes the ultimate claim construction from the interpretation of 
intrinsic evidence.  In particular, this Note identifies two types of intrinsic 
evidence: (a) disputes that can only be resolved by adopting the perspective 
of PHOSITA, and (b) disputes that can be solved using judicial canons of 
claim construction.  The former category represents a “mixed” question that 
requires applying the PHOSITA standard to the facts, while the latter 
category arguably represents a pure question of law. 
This Note identifies the appropriate standard of review for claim 
construction in IPR proceedings.  The Note argues that for questions of fact 
(e.g., disputes over the meaning of extrinsic evidence), the appropriate 
standard of review is the substantial evidence standard.  For questions of law 
(e.g., interpreting the BRI standard), the appropriate standard of review 
should usually be the Auer “clearly erroneous” standard.  Finally, for mixed 
questions applying the law to the facts (e.g., the ultimate claim construction), 
this Note argues that the appropriate standard of review is the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard.  Importantly, the standard of review of the ultimate 
claim construction is the arbitrary and capricious standard, which is much 
more deferential than the de novo standard outlined in Teva. 
Finally, this Note argues that the effect of a more deferential standard 
of review for PTO claim construction could be that defendants in patent 
infringement lawsuits are unfairly given the upper hand.  By affording more 
deference to invalidity decisions based on the BRI standard than invalidity 
decisions based on the OCM, the current system favors the BRI standard.  
The BRI standard itself favors defendants, who argue for broader claim 
construction because broader claims cover more prior art and patents are 
most often held invalid based on the prior art.  Traditionally, defendants paid 
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a price for arguing broader claim construction — if they lost on the invalidity 
claim, then the broader claim construction could be used against them on the 
plaintiff’s infringement claim.  Now, defendants can argue invalidity with 
the PTO under the BRI standard and receive deference, and then switch their 
arguments in district court by arguing for a narrower OCM for the plaintiff’s 
infringement claim.  Since the BRI is by definition the “broadest” 
interpretation, the defendants are justified in narrowing their claim 
constructions. 
Since the appropriate standard of review must be one of deference under 
the APA, this Note suggests that the best way to alleviate the unbalance 
created by the current system is to make the claim construction standards the 
same in district court and IPR proceedings.  One way to do this is for 
Congress to pass the aforementioned bills proposing using the OCM in IPR.  
Another way is to consolidate the BRI and OCM standard into one unified 
standard, which this Note argues is a real possibility due to many similarities 
between the two standards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
